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PROSECUTORIAL CONTROL OVER A
DEFENDANT'S CHOICE OF COUNSEL
William J. Genego*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, federal prosecutors have discovered a
new weapon in their adversary arsenal - the ability to exercise con-
trol over a defendant's choice of counsel. This development can be
understood, at least in part, as a response to a change in the criminal
defense bar. Beginning in the early to mid-1970s, federal
prosecutorial resources were allocated to white-collar crimes and
later to drug-related offenses.' These changes in policy brought into
the criminal justice system a significant population of defendants
who had the economic resources to retain attorneys and compensate
them generously. The compensation attracted lawyers to the practice
of criminal defense and enabled attorneys representing such clients to
finance comprehensive defense efforts.' In these areas, the traditional
resource limitations that accompany the defense of criminal prosecu-
tions were lifted, and defense counsel began to present vigorous
challenges to the government.
For the first time, on a regular basis, prosecutors did not have a
© 1987 By William J. Genego
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center; B.S., 1972,
New York University; J.D., 1975, Yale University; LL.M., 1977, Georgetown University
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1. See K. MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS
AT WORK 19 (1985) [hereinafter MANN]. In 1979 the Justice Department established the
Economic Crime Enforcement (ECE) Program "to attack nationwide the problem of white-
collar crime." U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AN IMPLEMENTATION STUDY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE ECONOMIC CRIME ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (December 1980). The ECE Pro-
gram concentrated manpower in selected offices of the U.S. Attorneys to enhance the Depart-
ment's capability to combat white-collar crime. Each unit consists of three full-time Assistant
Attorneys General of the Justice Department's Criminal Division. As reported to Congress,
the top priorities of the division were white-collar crime, political corruption, organized crime
and drug trafficking. Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Justice of the House
Committee of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d sess. 2 (1980) (statement of Philip B. Heymann,
Dept. of Justice).
2. In 1977, Paul Connolly, the head of the American Bar Association's section on litiga-
tion, remarked that white-collar criminal defense was the fastest growing legal specialty. See
MANN, supra note 1, at 21.
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significant resource advantage over their opponents.' This change in
defense resources prompted a predictable adversarial response -
prosecutors reacted to the presence of such well-equipped adversa-
ries. Prosecutors began to use a series of practices that enable them
to exercise control over defendants' choice of counsel.' Such practices
include motions to disqualify attorneys from representing clients,
subpoenas issued to lawyers for client-related information, and at-
tempts to forfeit fees paid to attorneys or to prevent defendants from
using their assets to retain attorneys. The growing use of these prac-
tices poses a serious threat to both defendants' choice of counsel
under the sixth amendment and to the adversary process.
As criticism of such prosecutorial practices has increased, com-
mon prosecutorial responses have emerged. One argument frequently
made by prosecutors is that defendants will always have lawyers,
therefore, disqualification of a specific lawyer or of paid lawyers as a
group, does not present a serious threat to sixth amendment rights.5
Prosecutors maintain that if a defendant receives a competent law-
yer, the functions served by prosecutorial practices outweigh the
defendant's particular choice of counsel.' Further, prosecutors dis-
count the criticism as being primarily motivated by the economic
self-interest of the private criminal defense bar.
This article addresses the question of whether these practices
which provide prosecutorial control over defendants' choice of coun-
sel is proper. In section II of the article, I review the prosecutorial
3. As the government shifted its focus to white-collar and drug-related offenses, the pool
of defendants became more heavily composed of people with the ability to spend large amounts
of money on legal representation. This created a demand for defense experts, which was filled
largely by highly skilled and well-trained attorneys who had the experience and resources to
become effective adversaries to prosecutors. See generally MANN, supra note 1, at 20-22.
4. The emergence of the practices may also be understood as reflecting the particular
investigative and prosecutorial needs associated with white collar and complex federal drug
offenses. In contrast to offenses such as theft and robbery, many white-collar and complex
drug-related offenses commonly involve a series of acts, some of them not necessarily criminal
in isolation, numerous participants and financial transactions. Gathering evidence to prove
such offenses may require techniques different than those used to investigate and prosecute
other types of criminal offenses. Further, the practices might also be seen as a means to re-
spond to what is perceived by some to be the increasing problem of attorney involvement in
such offenses.
5. This argument by prosecutors is discussed in THE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL ADVO-
CACY OF THE N.Y. CITY BAR ASS'N, THE FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEY FEES IN CRIMINAL
CASES: A CALL FOR IMMEDIATE REMEDIAL ACTION at 480, 492, 503 (1986) [hereinafter
FORFEITURE].
6. As is discussed infra, the practices may serve a variety of purposes. For example,
subpoenas served upon attorneys might provide the government with evidence that will be used
to prove criminal wrongdoing, and forfeiture of attorneys' fees is said to insure that a defend-
ant is not able to obtain benefit from the proceeds of illegal activity.
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practices now in vogue, briefly explain how they provide the prose-
cution with control over defendant's choice of counsel and discuss the
frequency with which they are used. Section III then examines the
validity of the practices and explains why examining the objectives of
such practices is an unsatisfactory 'measure by which to judge their
legitimacy. Finally, in section IV, I propose a prescriptive definition
of adversarial fairness based on the allocation of adversarial powers
that can be used to evaluate the legitimacy of the prosecutorial
practices.
II. THE PRACTICES AND PROSECUTORIAL CONTROL
A. Methods of Control
Discussion in this article is limited to three prosecutorial
practices: (1) efforts to disqualify an attorney from representing a
particular defendant; (2) the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to at-
torneys for client-related information; and (3) attempts to forfeit as-
sets transferred to an attorney as payment for legal services and re-
lated efforts to prevent a defendant from using his or her assets to
retain counsel. Each of these practices share two important charac-
teristics. First, the the prosecution has sole discretion in deciding
whether to employ one of the practices. Second, the successful use of
any of the practices may disqualify a specific attorney from repre-
senting a particular defendant.
1. Disqualifying an Attorney
The government may bring a motion to disqualify an attorney
from representing a specific client in a criminal case when the
government claims its interests will be adversely affected by such
representation. These government motions are commonly based on
the fact that the attorney has previously represented a witness who
will testify for the government at trial.7 In such cases, the govern-
ment argues that the possibility of cross-examining the witness with
information obtained through the prior attorney-client relationship
grants the defense attorney a competitive advantage over the gov-
ernment. In addition, the government argues that the attorney's
continued involvement intrudes upon the witness's attorney-client
7. See, e.g., United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
James, 708 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1981); see generally Margolin, Pretrial Disqualification of Crimi-
nal Defense Counsel, 20.AM. CaiM. L. REV. 228 (1982).
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privilege.8 In some cases, these disqualification motions are filed af-
ter an attorney has represented the defendant over a significant
period of time. Where the motion is successful, the defendant is de-
prived of representation by the attorney of his or her choice, despite
the pre-existing attorney-client relationship.
2. Grand Jury Subpoenas
Prosecutors may utilize grand jury subpoenas to obtain client-
related information from attorneys.' Although such subpoenas are
nominally issued by a grand jury, the decision to issue a subpoena is
actually controlled by the prosecutor conducting the grand jury's in-
vestigation. Information commonly requested of attorneys includes
evidence of payment of legal fees as well as business and financial
transactions conducted by the attorney for the client.
Although courts have held that the attorney-client privilege does
not generally bar the production of such information,"0 defense attor-
neys regularly challenge such subpoenas. These challenges - which
have sought to impose judicial controls over the prosecutor's ability
to obtain client-related information by subpoena - are based on
claims that such action interferes with the sixth amendment right to
counsel. The challenges, however, have generally been unsuccess-
ful." Prosecutors thus maintain relatively unbridled discretion to de-
cide when to issue such grand jury subpoenas.
Subpoenas issued to attorneys for client-related information
have an effect beyond providing information to the prosecution. Once
an attorney is required to provide client-related information to the
government, the lawyer must often cease representation. 2 The ethi-
cal prohibition precluding lawyers from being witnesses against their
clients generally prevents a lawyer from continuing to represent the
client in any criminal prosecution arising out of the investigation.'
3. Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees
Federal prosecutors claim to have the authority to seek forfei-
8. See O'Malley, 786 F.2d at 791.
9. See S. Rudolf & T. Moher, The Attorney Subpoena: You Are Hereby Commanded to
Betray Your Client, I CRIM. JUST. 15 (1986).
10. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1986) (en
bane); United States v. (Under Seal), 774 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1985).
11. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238; United
States v. (Under Seal), 774 F.2d 624.
12. See Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1984).
13. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9 & DR 5-102 (1980).
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ture of attorneys' fees by virtue of the "relation back" principle
added to 18 U.S.C. section 1963(c) and 21 U.S.C. section 853(c),
under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.14 Prosecutors
claim the decision to seek forfeiture of attorneys' fees is discretionary
and not subject to judicial control or supervision. 15 While some
courts have concluded that such forfeiture is constitutionally prohib-
ited, 6 the Department of Justice insists such efforts are proper and
has made known its intention to continue them." Forfeiture attempts
can also result in terminating a lawyer's representation of a client.
For several reasons, the prosecution's announcement of its in-
tention to seek forfeiture of any assets used to pay an attorney's fee,
may force an attorney to withdraw from continued representation of
his or her client. One such reason is that the attorney may be placed
in a conflict of interest position with the client." Similarly, a forfei-
ture attempt may place the attorney in the position of handling a
criminal case on a contingency fee basis, which is prohibited by the
Code of Professional Responsibility. 9 A third consequence of forfeit-
ing attorneys' fees is that the attorney may have to defend the case
with the prospect of not being paid for expenses and fees.
14. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1984)). Under the "relation
back" concept, the government's interest in property subject to forfeiture vests at the time of
the commission of the act which makes the property subject to forfeiture, and a subsequent
change in the ownership or form of property does not affect the government's interest. See
United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1310-14 (D. Md. 1986), appeal docketed, No.
86-5064 (4th Cir. May 19, 1986).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 21-33. The Department of Justice has issued
internal guidelines to provide guidance in deciding in what cases forfeiture of attorneys' fees
should be sought. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
GUIDELINES ON FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES, 9-111.000-9-111.700 (1985) [hereinafter
DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES). The Department, however, has insisted that these guidelines
are not subject to judicial enforcement. See also In re Special 1983 Grand Jury (Klein), 776
F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985).
16. United States v. Bassett, appeal docketed, No. 86-5064 (4th Cir. May 19, 1986).
United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Rogers,
602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
17. DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 9-111.210.
18. FORFEITURE, supra note 5, at 482. A conflict may exist because the forfeiture of the
attorney's fee can play a role in the disposition of the case. The attorney may be inclined to
pursue a disposition, through a plea agreement or result at trial, which will ensure that his or
her fee is not forfeited even though a result more favorable to the client might be obtained if
the money used to pay the attorney was forfeited to the government.
19. "A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee
for representing a defendant in a criminal case." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 2-106(c) (1980).
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B. Survey of Criminal Defense Lawyers
The prosecution's use of disqualification motions, subpoenas,
and forfeiture actions has reportedly increased. In May and June of
1985, I surveyed by mail, all of the members of the National Associ-
ation of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL). The survey consisted
of questions concerning the use of each of the prosecutorial practices
described above.20 A total of 1,648 persons, representing a response
rate of 42%, returned the survey questionnaire. Twenty-six percent
of the respondents (430) indicated they had been the subject of gov-
ernment attempts to disqualify them from representing particular
clients; 18% (294) responded that they had received grand jury sub-
poenas requesting client-related information; and 21% (348) reported
that the government had questioned or actually sought forfeiture of
the fees received by or to be paid to attorneys for representing crimi-
nal defendants.
Moreover, attorneys reported a dramatic increase in these prac-
tices over time. Eighty-eight percent of the attorneys who had been
subject to government disqualification efforts reported that the
attempted disqualifications had occurred since 1980; 86% of the at-
torneys who had received grand jury subpoenas indicated they had
received the subpoenas since 1980; and 95% of those attorneys whose
fees had been questioned reported that the fee challenges had oc-
curred between 1980 and June 1985.
C. Department of Justice Guidelines
Since the above survey was conducted, the Department of Jus-
tice has adopted internal guidelines governing the issuance of grand
jury subpoenas to attorneys and the forfeiture of attorneys' fees.2 1
These guidelines may reduce both the number of grand jury subpoe-
nas issued to attorneys and the government's efforts to institute
formal forfeiture proceedings against attorneys' fees. Even if such de-
creases occur, however, the effect of the disqualification practices will
remain significant.
20. The survey also addressed other prosecutorial practices which affect the representa-
tion of criminal defendants. A report on the findings of the survey is presented in Reports
From the Field: Prosecutorial Practices Compromising Effective Criminal Defense, THE
CHAMPION 7 (May, 1986) and Genego, Risky Business: The Hazards of Being a Criminal
Defense Lawyer, I CRIM. JUST. 2 (1986).
21. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUANCE
OF SUBPOENAS TO ATTORNEYS FOR INFORMATION RELATING TO THE REPRESENTATION OF
CLIENTS 9-2.161 (1985); DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 9-111.000-9-
111.700.
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First, the subpoena and attorneys' fees guidelines concede little
to the defense bar. The subpoena guidelines do not provide for any
review by a judicial officer or an independent official to determine
whether the subpoena seeks information that cannot be obtained
elsewhere. Moreover, the forfeiture guidelines authorize federal
prosecutors to seek attorneys' fees in a broad range of circumstances,
without any showing that the fees were part of a sham transfer of a
defendant's assets."2 Further, the Department has maintained that
the guidelines are not enforceable by courts.2"
Second, the threat of using the above practices may prove to be
almost as effective as the actual use of the practices. If a prosecutor
announces an intention to obtain a grand jury subpoena for a defense
attorney's records, the attorney may be motivated to voluntarily pro-
vide the information in order to avoid the expense and potential
notoriety of contesting the issuance of a subpoena. Similarly, a prose-
cutor's statement of intent to seek forfeiture of any fee paid to the
defense attorney may cause defense counsel to decide not to represent
a particular defendant. 4 Thus, the legitimacy of these practices must
be examined.
III. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICES
The defendant does not go without representation in cases in
which the prosecution practice results in the defendant being denied
the attorney of his or her choice: Although defendants might not ob-
tain their first choice, they are able to choose other lawyers or, if
necessary, the court appoints a lawyer.2" Many defendants do not get
their first choice of counsel for economic or other reasons. Prosecu-
tors argue that as long as defendants are able to receive representa-
tion from competent attorneys, there is little harm in using one of the
above practices to deny the defendant his or her attorney of choice.
Conversely, defense attorneys claim these practices are not legitimate
tactics and that prosecutors should not be allowed to utilize them in
the adversary contest.
22. A complete analysis of the deficiencies in both sets of guidelines is found in FORFEI-
TURE, supra note 5.
23. In re Special September 1983 Grand Jury (Klein), 776 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985).
24. Fourteen percent (230) of those attorneys responding to the survey indicated that
they had decided not to take a case because the government might attempt to forfeit their fee or
pursue an investigation of their practice.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, appeal pending, No. 86-5025 (4th Cir. Aug. 8,
1986).
1987]
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A. Methods of Judging Legitimacy
There are a number of ways to assess the legitimacy of such
prosecutorial practices. One possible measure is to rely on the objec-
tive or goal of a particular practice and ask whether that objective is
permissible. If the objective of an attempt to forfeit an attorney's fee
is to prevent a particular attorney from representing the defendant,
the practice is illegitimate and unfair. The prosecutor should not be
able to deprive the defendant of representation by the attorney of
defendant's choice simply to gain a competitive advantage. A convic-
tion should not be based on the defendant's inability to obtain
representation by his attorney of choice. While such an analysis is
attractive in its simplicity, it is ultimately unsatisfactory because the
prosecutor can always articulate a legitimate objective to justify a
particular practice."' Consequently, inquiry into a prosecutor's true
motive is difficult, if not impossible."
The legitimacy of certain prosecutorial practices can also be
evaluated by focusing on the particular right that is affected by a
given practice. The practices identified above affect the sixth amend-
ment rights of defendants. Because the right to counsel is central to
the proper functioning of the adversary' process, 8 prosecutorial
practices which interfere with that right potentially undermine the
adversarial process, regardless of whether the prosecutor can propose
a legitimate objective for the practice." Alternatively, the prosecutor
could be required to demonstrate that the government's benefit from
the practice outweighs the harm to the defendant's sixth amendment
rights.3 0
All of the above methods have significant shortcomings in evalu-
ating whether the practices should generally be accepted as
legitimate adversarial tactics. A more direct means of evaluating the
26. For example, to justify forfeiture attempts, prosecutors assert they are merely
preventing defendants from benefiting from proceeds of illegal activity. See Landers, Attorney
Fee Forfeiture: Can It BeJustified? Yes, 1 CRIM. JUST. 8 (1986).
27. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Government Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Con-
stitutional Bar Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1097 (1978).
28. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
29. Under current doctrinal analysis, however, the scope of the sixth amendment right
to counsel is limited by a variety of factors, including that a defendant is generally required to
demonstrate prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
30. Such a cost-benefit analysis however, is dependent upon the subjective valuations
placed upon the costs and benefits, and even what should be counted as relevant costs and
benefits may be in disagreement. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 457 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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validity of prosecutorial practices is needed. This article proposes a
method of judging the legitimacy of prosecutorial practices which is
independent of the defendant's rights affected by these practices.
This method is premised upon developing a prescriptive definition of
adversarial fairness which can be used by courts to assess the legiti-
macy of prosecutorial practices in the context of the adversary con-
flict. The method focuses upon the allocation of adversarial powers
between the defense and prosecution.
B. The Allocation of Power in the Adversary System
It is first important to recognize that the adversary model of the
criminal process is premised upon a stable and predictable allocation
of power81 between the state and the individual.8 For the proper
functioning of the system, it is essential that any allocation of power
must be fixed at the outset of the contest, and must not be subject to
the unilateral control of one of the parties. If a party is able to con-
trol the allocation of powers so as to maintain a consistently superior
advantage over its opponent, the goals of the process, 8 which are
assumed to be achieved by the outcome of a fair contest, cannot be
attained.84 When one adversary has the ability to unilaterally control
the power allocation or rights of its opponent, the process will not
only fail to function properly, but will be robbed of its legitimacy.
From this perspective, the adversary system is a set allocation of
powers which is fixed at the outset.
1. Powers of the State
The allocation of power in the adversary system stems from a
variety of sources: the Constitution, legislative enactments, court
rules, and tradition or custom. A government's power in the criminal
process is vested in the prosecutor and associated law enforcement
31. The term "power" as used here, refers collectively to the rights, options and protec-
tions that a party has available in the context of the adversary process.
32. See generally Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The War-
ren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983); Saltzburg, The Flow
and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO.
L.J. 151, 157 (1980); Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
33. See Arenella, supra note 32, at 188.
34. As a number of commentators have discussed, the notion that anything resembling
parity of power between the state and the individual exists in the criminal justice system may
well be a false ideal, not at all reflective of the reality of the operation of the system. See
Rudovsky, The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police in THE POLITICS OF LAW
242-43 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in
Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 792 (1970).
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personnel. The major component of the prosecution's power is the
tradition of its monopoly on criminal law enforcement. Prosecutors
have the authority to decide to initiate a criminal investigation
against an individual, to define the scope of the investigation, and to
select the charges to be alleged. The prosecution also has the power
to gather and compel evidence through a variety of processes and
procedures."5 In addition, the charging authority gives the prosecutor
control of the range of sanctions a person may face. The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence pro-
vide the prosecution with additional powers.3" The prosecutor, by
virtue of custom, also has the right to make the first opening state-
ment to the jury, the right to present rebuttal evidence to the defend-
ant's cases and the right to make two summations to the jury. These
procedures all work to the advantage of the prosecution in attempt-
ing to convict the defendant.
2. Powers of the Defendant
These same sources, the Constitution, statutes, and historical
custom, allocate powers to defendants. The.Bill of Rights 7 provides
for protection against self-incrimination, for the rights of compulsory
process, for confrontation of the state's witnesses and for the assis-
tance of counsel. Statutes and rules also provide the defendant with
certain powers, including a limited right to compel discovery from
the prosecution 8 and the right to prevent the prosecution from join-
ing unrelated offenses for trial." Historical tradition and custom
provide a defendant with the advantage of the presumption of inno-
cence, the requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the requirement of a unanimous verdict for
conviction.
Of all defendants' powers, the right to the assistance of counsel
35. For example, under the Constitution, law enforcement personnel may, under certain
circumstances, seize evidence and obtain other information from citizens. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. Similarly, prosecutors may use grand jury subpoenas to compel a person to pro-
duce tangible evidence and to compel sworn testimony.
36. In federal court, for example, the prosecutor has the right to demand that a defend-
ant disclose his or her intention to rely on an alibi or mental defense. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
12.1, 12.2. Similarly, the federal rules of evidence give prosecutors the ability to use evidence
of a defendant's uncharged misconduct to help prove that the defendant committed the crime
charged. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
38. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1984); FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
39. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 8.
[Vol. 27
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is arguably the most important.40 While other rights are integral to
the proper functioning of the adversary process, only the right to
counsel enables the defendant to assert his or her other rights. The
defendant's sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel en-
compasses a limited right to be represented by the attorney of his or
her choice."' As one court has stated, "the most important decision a
defendant makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an attor-
ney."' 42 Although the defendant's right to counsel of his or her choice
is not absolute,4 the prosecution has never before been given a role
in selecting, influencing or vetoing the defendant's choice of attorney.
IV. UNILATERAL CONTROL OVER THE ALLOCATION OF POWER
As noted above, the allocation of power must be set at the
beginning of the contest. However, the respective powers of the ad-
versaries are not fixed throughout time. For example, when Con-
gress amended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to provide
the prosecution with a right to reciprocal discovery from the defend-
ant,44 Congress gave additional powers to the prosecutor which af-
fected the overall balance of power between adversaries. Similarly,
the courts constantly, and sometimes explicitly, shift the allocation of
adversarial powers." Indeed, the historical development of the right
40. "In an adversary system of criminal justice, there is no right more essential than the
right to the assistance of counsel." Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978); see also
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Ac-
cused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1982).
41. See Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162
(1982).
42. United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1979).
43. For example, the exercise of the right may not be used to manipulate the scheduling
of a trial. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
44. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
45. On some occasions, courts have explicitly referred to the concept of a balance of
forces between adversaries in defining the rights of the parties. See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon,
412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554-56 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). That is, courts have defined the rights of the parties (or allocation of
power) based on the notion that there must be a rough semblance of parity between adversa-
ries. Recently, for example, the Supreme Court refused to extend the rule of Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), to apply to a demand by a lawyer, rather than the defendant, to
have counsel present during police interrogation, on the ground that the original boundaries of
Miranda (requiring the defendant to assert the right), struck the proper balance between the
interests of law enforcement and the rights of the accused. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135
(1986). Justice O'Connor, in writing for the majority, explicitly stated that the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination does not require that the police provide assistance to the
defendant in taking the best tactical position possible in the litigation. Id. at 1142. In other
words, the Court refused to expand Miranda and the privilege against self-incrimination to
give the defendant a greater tactical advantage than is already provided defendants.
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to counsel reflects the Supreme Court's growing recognition that as-
sistance of counsel must be guaranteed if the balance of power is to
remain relatively stable."'
While the individual components of the balance of powers con-
tinually change, such change in the allocation of rights and powers
must be beyond the control of the parties themselves. An arrange-
ment in which one of the litigants could control what rights were to
be accorded its opponent would undermine the entire concept of a
balance of power between adversaries. Any contest between adversa-
ries in which one of the opponents has the ability to unilaterally
determine and control the rights that may be exercised by its adver-
sary cannot be considered fair or legitimate. The outcome of the
litigation in such a situation would be determined solely by one
party's exercise of control over the rights granted to the other party.
In short, one of the parties would have the ability to control the
results by changing the rules to ensure that it would win.
It is true that the adversaries in every case attempt to exercise
their power to defeat the opponent. In so doing, adversaries attempt
to influence and exercise control over the rights of their opponent.
For example, a prosecutor may bring additional charges in the hope
that the defendant will decide to plead guilty rather than proceed to
trial. In such an instance, the prosecutor is attempting to exercise
control over the defendant's right to trial by employing one of its
allocated powers - the power to decide what charges to allege. In
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,'7 the prosecution brought additional
charges against the defendant in response to his assertion of his right
to proceed to trial. The additional charges meant that the defendant,
if convicted, faced a mandatory life imprisonment term rather than
the two to ten year term he faced when the prosecution was initiated.
There was no dispute that the prosecutor's purpose in making the
additional charges was to force the defendant to forfeit his right to a
jury trial and plead guilty. While this tactic was surely coercive and
was meant to affect the defendant's exercise of one of his most im-
portant rights, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution's ad-
ding of charges was an acceptable practice in the overall context of
the adversary battle.4' The prosecution was using one of its allocated
46. See Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths - A
Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986); Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181 (1984).
47. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
48. Id. at 364. It can be persuasively argued that the Court's decision in Hayes was
wrong and that the practice used there should not be allowed because it legitimizes
[Vol. 27
1987]
powers (the charging function) to accomplish a legitimate objective
(to encourage pleas of guilty).
In contrast, when a prosecutor issues a grand jury subpoena to
defendant's lawyer and thereby deprives the defendant of that law-
yer's services, the prosecutor oversteps the bounds of adversarial fair-
ness. Even though the prosecutor is employing an allocated power
(the right to gather all unprivileged evidence of a crime) in an at-
tempt to help ensure a conviction, the prosecutor's actions are unjus-
tified because they effectively deny the defendant a choice of counsel.
Unlike the situation in Hayes, the defendant cannot decide, despite
heavy pressure, to exercise a power allocated to him or her. The
prosecutor is able to deprive the defendant of the lawyer of his or her
choice. While the prosecutor in Hayes may have been using heavy
handed tactics in attempting to force the defendant to forego his right
to a jury trial, the prosecutor was not able to control the allocation of
power; the defendant was still free to reject the prosecutor's demands
and proceed to trial.
V. CONCLUSION
The legitimacy of the prosecutorial practices which can result in
a defendant being denied the attorney of his or her choice may be
analyzed under the principle of unilateral adversarial control over
the allocation of powers. Under this principal, prosecutorial prac-
tices, such as bringing a motion to disqualify a defense attorney,
would be permissible because the prosecutor must seek and obtain
judicial approval for the disqualification. Thus, tactics which do not
provide the prosecution with unilateral control over the defendant's
powers may be seen as not being prohibited by this principle.
In contrast, practices which enable the prosecutor to deprive the
defendant of his sixth amendment right to counsel of his or her
choice without judicial authorization would be prohibited. Grand
jury subpoenas issued to attorneys for client-related information, for-
feiture allegations against attorneys' fees, and the threat of seeking
forfeiture of fees enable the prosecutor to exercise unilateral control
over the allocation of power to the defendant. Because these practices
give prosecutors unilateral and absolute control over the allocation of
power, the practices are not legitimate adversarial tactics.
The problem of identifying a prescriptive definition of adver-
sarial fairness is difficult and complex. The principle discussed here,
prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id. at 372 (Powell, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, for the purposes
of the present discussion, Hayes is accepted on its own terms.
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prohibiting unilateral adversarial control over the allocation of pow-
ers, is proposed as a useful means of defining what is different, and
dangerous, about prosecutorial practices which affect defendants'
sixth amendment right to counsel. Left unchecked, the government's
ability to affect the representation received by a defendant through
these practices has serious implications for the proper functioning of
the adversary system and for the fairness and legitimacy of the crimi-
nal justice system.
